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**TURKISH VILLAGE  
DISPUTING BEHAVIOR**

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THIS PAPER attempts to suggest connections between conflict, social structure, disputant's choice of remedy agent, and dispute-handling institutions.<sup>1</sup>

In a Turkish village, certain important kinds of social relations are highly productive of conflict. Persons in conflict in paired status and role relations (such as father-son, sibling-sibling, husband-wife, patron-client) must then choose a remedy agency. There are different kinds of remedy agents available each of which have specific characteristics. When a person invokes informal, village, customary, or negotiatory methods of settling grievances, he is choosing flexible methods in which all interested parties can have input into the outcome, and in which there are ways of neutralizing (but not overturning) rank differences between disputants. A person may opt for formal court arbitration if he is dissatisfied with a negotiated village outcome; if he wants to undermine the social and political rank of his village opponent; if he wants to limit the area of conflict; or if he wants to dispute over resources.

There are two central points I wish to make. First, the state's methods for processing village disputes not only provide different out-

comes (zero-sum as opposed to negotiatory) and different types of solutions than do the informal village methods, but also the use of one arena rather than another has consequences for the disputants' social relations and for the remedy agency itself. To use a village method of handling conflict is to accept the structure of enduring status relations in the village. To go to court, on the other hand, *may* be an attempt to disrupt or change existing power relations between people in different statuses. Or it may be an attempt to limit a disruptive, conflict-ridden social relation that is not amenable to village negotiation. This leads to the second point, which is that going to court has different meanings to different litigants in different status and role relations and in different types of disputes (such as those over land, marital obligations, debt, and the like). In attempting to account for both the patterns of village disputing and the reasons underlying these patterns, I do not claim any great originality for the concepts I use or the explanations I give. But I do hope that my analysis points toward an understanding of how change takes place in disputing behaviors, and institutions at the local level.

Other social scientists have found it useful to isolate the events occurring in particular disputes (this was a strength of the extended case method as used by Nader 1965a, 1965b; Van Velsen 1964, 1967; and Gulliver 1969a, 1969b); but a drawback is that it obscures how disputes between two persons connect with other disputing persons, since any disputing episode is usually classified under one extended case only. It further obscures disputing behaviors which "push" the case forward to a new stage of resolution, but which, in themselves, remain *unmarked* as a stage in disputing (e.g., the threat of force, a violent argument). A disputing technique is defined as any attempt to communicate a grievance to an opponent. The technique may or may not make the complaint public.

To circumvent problems in the case method, all instances in which a villager used a disputing technique (e.g., public confrontation, private negotiation) or interacted with a dispute-handling institution were charted independently of the particular extended case in which the behavior was originally classified during my fieldwork or during the first analysis of cases in my dissertation (Starr 1970). This

independent charting provided 104 instances of disputing behaviors. Of these, sixty-six, or two-thirds, took place in the village, and thirty-eight, or one-third, took place outside the geographic boundaries of the village. Of those handled out of the village, nearly one-half went to the Bodrum district court.<sup>2</sup>

What is most surprising about these data is that villagers in an area as remote as Mandalinci village in 1967-68 appealed to Turkish officials in provincial capitals and even in Ankara in attempting to find solutions to grievances (compare Nader 1965b). Such complaints concerned (1) the behavior of gendarmerie, (2) bias in award of local civil service jobs, and (3) court decisions. The picture we obtain from these data is not of the helplessness of naive villagers isolated from sources of power, but instead, of the ingenuity of *some* villagers in seeking solutions to problems in the face of increasing bureaucratic and administrative control.

When disputing incidents are placed in the context of social relations, roughly twenty-seven separate disputes<sup>3</sup> can be distinguished. By dispute, I mean nothing more than a social relation between two or more people who are in contact (or communication) and who choose to emphasize the conflict within their relationship.<sup>4</sup> The underlying cause of most disputes is conflict over control of scarce resources (a scarce resource is something people value which is in limited supply),<sup>5</sup> although ostensible claims are made on grounds of insults to honor, prestige, incorrect behavior, lying, or slander.

These twenty-seven disputes from Mandalinci village involve approximately sixty-six Mandalinci villagers as principals (forty-four males, twenty-two females). Nonvillage principals were one gendarme, one gendarme captain, one Bodrum lighthouse official, six residents of other villages, and five foreigners (citizens of other countries).

My data may not be a representative sample; in fact, the district court docket for the same period reveals that more Mandalinci villagers were involved in disputing at court than my village study reveals. The village-collected data do, however, point out trends in village disputing behaviors, and to some degree suggest the parameters of disputing techniques which Mandalinci people use.

### THE SETTING

Mandalinci is a fictitious name for a village of 1,000 Turkish people (247 households) at the edge of the Aegean Sea on the Bodrum peninsula in the southwest corner of Turkey. Mandalinci, which means "tangerine grower," is one of thirty villages in the district of Bodrum, administered by Bodrum town (population 5,200).

At the time of my fieldwork, the trip by four-wheel-drive vehicle between Izmir and the village took about six hours; by Turkish transportation (jeeps, buses, cargo trucks) it was often much longer. At the end of August 1968 an all-weather bridge was completed on the Izmir-Milas section, and the road between Milas and Bodrum was asphalted. By coincidence, the ending of this district's isolation coincided with the end of my fieldwork.

Mandalinci village is dispersed over four miles of inland valley and seashore with houses grouped into six different nucleated neighborhoods or isolated at the edge of tangerine orchards. The villagers practice mixed agriculture and animal husbandry. Household food and cash crops (tangerines, tomatoes, squash, watermelon, artichoke, and several kinds of beans) are grown in fields, some of which are irrigated for spring and summer vegetables. All citrus fruits are grown in walled, irrigated orchards and sold between December and March. Cows, donkeys, and camels are grazed by villagers in the higher hills. Neither of the two boats owned by villagers are used for commercial fishing and rarely for sport fishing. Although the village has a seaside area and a deep-water harbor adequate for anchorage of large boats, the villagers are not seafaring people. They are essentially agriculturalists; the focus of their activities and interests is on crop growing and animal husbandry. Animals are necessary for plowing fields and transporting crops to roadside areas, where they can be loaded onto transport trucks. A few villagers raise cows for spring sale to slaughterhouses in Istanbul.

There are three residential units within the village: the household, the residence group, and the neighborhood. The household is the primary unit of social identity and socialization. A household occupies a one-room or two-room house and is an eating and sleeping unit, which typically contains a nuclear family (a husband, a wife,

and their unmarried children). Sometimes a widowed parent (of husband or of wife) sleeps in a separate house nearby but eats with the family.

The "ideal" residence rule is patrilocal, but many considerations intervene in the decision by a couple concerning where to live, so that the resulting residence groups are in fact sets of kin, recruited with some patrilineal bias. These residential groups consist of two or three adjoining households that cooperate in food preparation, child care, and sometimes in cultivation of gardens, fields, and orchards. Such cooperating households contain married adults related to each other by sibling or parent-child ties. But patterns of mutual cooperation between households rarely continue more than one to three years, and not every village family is part of a residential kin group.

The third residential unit is the neighborhood (*mahalle*). There are six nucleated neighborhoods, four of which have names. Newer houses are isolated at the edges of the tangerine orchards. Nucleated neighborhoods typically contain older village houses in which live closely related kin. For reasons that will be discussed later, village marriages have tended to be endogamous, so that most people in each neighborhood have several kin ties to each other. Likewise, most village members (except for three in-migrating households) can trace a kin tie to each other. Neighborhoods are the sites of intensive interaction and visiting, but neighborhood membership confers no corporate advantages and has no additional "meaning" to members except as a setting for routinized daily activities. Households that own a tangerine orchard usually move out of a nucleated neighborhood when they can afford to build an orchard cottage. The demands of irrigating citrus orchards mean that someone has to determine on a daily basis, from June through November, whether or not the trees need watering. This "watering watchfulness" has drawn households from the nucleated neighborhoods to the comparative isolation of the orchards, but the patterns of visiting, by men to the coffeehouses and women to each other's hearths, continues.

The fourth residential unit is the village itself. Although Turkish administrators who visit the village consider it a corporate unit, Mandalinci residents do not conceive of it in this way. I found consider-

able disagreement among the villagers as to whether several households in a remote named area were part of the village. In discussions of village history with both villagers and Turkish officials, it became apparent to me that administrators had drawn village boundaries to fit administrative needs rather than village sentiment. Many of the world's people, however, live in nucleated groups and interact intensely with their neighbors without developing a corporate ideology, so that lack of corporateness in Mandalinci is neither typically nor atypically Turkish or Middle Eastern.

### *The Village and Its History*

If an explanation need be found for the lack of corporate village-wide institutions, it perhaps lies in the diverse ways and reasons households came to settle the area. Until the increased animosity between Greece and Turkey in 1919 and after, the valley and seashore area were inhabited largely by Greek-speaking people. The Turkish population lived primarily in the high mountains (a forty-five minute hike from the present village center), and only three or four Turkish-speaking households had land and houses on the plain. Many Turkish and Greek-speaking households spent the summer in the Mandalinci area, and the winter in a variety of different locations elsewhere on the peninsula or nearby islands.

Households had maintained loose networks that gave them access to diverse land, brides, and information. Stretching up and down the entire Bodrum peninsula and to nearby islands, these networks linked the area together as households migrated between winter and summer pasturage. Some of the current Turkish households can remember times as late as the mid-1950s, when they still practiced biannual migrations with a few sheep between summer fields and winter pastures. All the Greek-speaking households left the area between 1919 and 1922, because of hostility between Greek and Turkish ethnic groups. It is from this period that the modern Turkish-speaking village of Sunni Muslims dates.

Under the *Shari'a* (Islamic family law and custom), daughters had rights to receive one-half the amount of land that sons did. The *Shari'a* had been collected and codified under Ottoman officials as

the *Mecelle* of 1876, and it was essentially this body of law which was practiced and interpreted by rural Islamic judges, the *kadi*. The Ottoman Empire, which had allied itself with Germany and Austria, continued in form and substance until its demise at the Peace Conference at Versailles, held by the European powers to end World War I. (Ottoman inheritance law is and was irrelevant to Mandalinci villagers.) Ataturk's legal reforms included new Turkish Family Laws, incorporated in the Civil Code of 1926, which gave equal inheritance rights to all siblings for the first time in Turkish history.

With the development of cash cropping, beginning in the late 1940s, land became a valuable resource, and claims to exclusive ownership were advanced and upheld. Households settled near their orchards to protect their property, and in response to the work routines of citrus farming. Households owning citrus orchards began arranging marriages to other orchardist households in the village, so that more dense kin networks were forged within Mandalinci. This density of village networks resulted from decisions that households made as a way of focusing, collecting, and mobilizing resources.

By the late 1960s the following statements could be made about households permanently settled in the village: (1) at least five households represent members of local or regional elites, while the others do not; (2) women over forty years of age came from other areas and almost always from areas which differed from their husbands'; (3) some households came to the area as already established households; (4) village households lacking agnatic ties generally did not come from similar locales on the peninsula or islands and do not share similar household histories; (5) most household histories differ in details, such as place of origin of members, decisions concerning where to live, what mode of economic activity to pursue, and periods in the household cycle when these decisions were made; (6) many households of more than a twenty-year span have lived in several places, sometimes including cities (Milas, Izmir, or Aydin) for varying periods before deciding to come to (or back to) the village to practice citrus agriculture; (7) some foresighted fathers (now in their seventies) financed their male offspring in jobs or businesses in western Turkish cities, where the sons now are neighborhood storekeepers, taxi driv-

ers, or restaurateurs in small neighborhood cafes; and (8) these same fathers married their daughters to Mandalinci youths and set up the couples as caretakers of their orchards, perhaps because it was easier to control a son-in-law than a son. In summary, households share generalized cultural values, but the accommodations and adaptations of specific households to changing economic and social circumstances vary according to their social class origins and to early decisions concerning land.

### *Village Social Structure and the Causes of Disputes*

*The Family.* A family is based on the sexual union of a man and woman, who have usually obtained a civil marriage license (*nikah*) in Bodrum and have celebrated a wedding in the village. A nuclear family is the basic kin unit in Mandalinci, and is the core unit of any household. A family is tied to other families by kinship, marriage, residence, or contractual agreements. Contractual agreements between households are primarily economic in nature and are based on a tenant/landlord, landowner/day laborer relationship, or on another short-term work agreement.

Within the family, there is marked division of labor, and within the village there is marked segregation of the sexes. Adolescent girls and women do not go to a village store to buy staples, for to do so they would have to pass by men sitting at the coffeehouses, and such behavior would imply a curiosity about men or some kind of laxity and unchastity on their part. The highest compliment a Mandalinci man can pay a married woman is to say she is *temiz* (literally, clean), and most village women are careful to keep their virtue above question. The degree of goodwill and affection between married people varies considerably, but if a couple does not get along, the marked separation of the sexes allows them to interact only infrequently.

### *Type of Disputes Generated by the Village Social Structure*

The older Turkish value system emphasized sibling unity and the quick resolution of discord between them. However, control of a tangerine orchard gives cash benefits, and hence power and prestige that

are unavailable when that orchard is divided among heirs. Furthermore, Atatürk's "received, Western" inheritance laws, embodied in the Civil Code of 1926, stated that all siblings regardless of sex are to be given an equal share in the patrimony at the death of the father, after the widow has taken one-fourth.

Since the requirements of tangerine orcharding can be met by a single, nucleated household with two teenage children, some household heads wish to claim exclusive rights to an orchard and to find ways to undercut the inheritance claims of their siblings. Thus, orchards and land suitable for orchards become foci of two types of disputes: (1) those between siblings after the death of the father; and (2) those between father and adult sons over control of the orchard while the father is still living. ♣ ♣ father may keep his son—even a married son in his forties—in a tenant farmer position, and keep him there indefinitely until the father is so feeble or senile that he can no longer challenge his son's control. Conflicts between fathers and sons thus have to do with control of the land, and especially with such decisions as where to sell the produce, how much to spend in intensifying agricultural production, whether or not to diversify crops, and the like.

97 A second area of disputing concerns male honor and female chastity. Youths from poorer households cannot amass the cash to pay the bride wealth to marry at eighteen or twenty, and the moral standards of the village require that unmarried girls maintain not only modesty but discreetness and social distance between themselves and young men in order to enforce that chastity. Thus married women in their late twenties become the focus of seduction by unmarried but sexually interested youths. Such women have usually been married for ten or more years and, now sexually experienced, are either bored with or ignored by their husbands. Their husbands, men in their thirties to fifties, spend a great deal of day and evening time in the company of other men, because this ensures that when they have a crisis or problem, they will have access to other males for advice and strategy planning. The company of other males is crucial to maintaining the delicate balance of reciprocal relations, of obligations and favors, needed to gain information and to maintain social rank in a

number of arenas necessary for survival in the political life of the village.

A wife who becomes involved in an adulterous liaison tarnishes not only her husband's but her brother's honor as well. Thus brothers continually guard their married sisters' behavior, and maintain a watchfulness over their sister's virtue, which the sisters (especially those involved in extramarital affairs) find tedious and loathsome. When a brother interferes, attempting to correct his sister's behavior, her refusal to admit the liaison or, if acknowledged, to break it off usually infuriates the brother, who may strike her, giving her grounds for a criminal case in court.

Thus social and structural features combine with the village value system to generate two types of relations that have intrinsic possibilities for prolonged conflict and disputing. The first is the father-son relationship after the son has gained adult status and thus is competing for rank in the village political arena of information sharing and reciprocal debts and favors, but is still unable to gain access to the sources of prestige and power, which can only come from making crucial decisions concerning the use of the family land. As long as his father makes these family decisions, any political maneuvering the son does is essentially on behalf of his father. Conversely, a son who can successfully negotiate decisions with his father, in order to gain income-producing property of his own (e.g., land, a store, a transportation vehicle), probably has become equally sophisticated in negotiating with other village men.

The second conflict-laden relationship is the one between siblings. Here the disputes are focused either on inheritance of property or on the sister's conduct. The longest and most intense disputes I witnessed in the village occurred between two sets of adult siblings: a pair of brothers and a brother and sister. The area of conflict and the basis of court cases involved insult, hitting, and slander, as well as contested rights to land. At least three land title cases occurred between the brothers, and at least two cases of assault between the brother and sister. As the Bodrum judges began to unravel the conflicting land claims, the intensity of violent interaction diminished, although neither set of siblings returned to warm and reciprocal rela-

tions during my village contact. Thus prolonged conflict over land tends to undermine older patterns of respect, loyalty, and obedience between siblings and between fathers and sons.

#### *Village Factions and Patron-Client Ties*

Two rival factions exist in the village, and these tend to be focused around patron-client rather than agnatic ties. One leader bases his authority on his status as a member of the regional elite and on his large land holdings, since he thus has diverse clients dependent on his patronage. He employs over fifty workers in his fields in summer, picking, weeding, watering, and transporting produce to his weighing and boxing areas at the seaside, where trucks, hired by him, load in summer and autumn. He often buys produce from his clients, paying them in cash and sending vegetables off to markets in Bodrum, Izmir, or Istanbul in hired trucks. He owns the only village olive press. He either buys olives directly from the villagers or presses their olives, keeping a fixed portion of the oil for his services. This oil he sells for profit in Bodrum. His household has such high rank in the village that no one dares dispute with him. In fact, the only gossip I ever heard concerning him or his household (outside of the information that his fifteen-year-old son was adopted) was that he was stingy because he charged high interest rates on loans. A member of his faction runs a small store at the seaside, where villagers purchase matches, kerosene for lanterns, cigarettes, rice, and sometimes flour, potatoes, eggs, and butter. These are usually bought on credit, to be paid off twice a year, after seasonal crops are sold.

The leader of the other faction is a "self-made" man, according to villagers. He dominates the central village area, and organizes landless village men, women, and children to collect snails, bay leaves, and other wild flora and fauna, which he buys for a few lira and sells for profit in Bodrum. Few nonkin work in his field and orchard, but he runs a competing village store, which has more items than the seaside one and also some manufactured clothing. Credit and cash are available at his store at no interest, and thus he has transformed a series of dyadic, asymmetrical ties into patron-client ties as his wealth and power have grown. He married his oldest son to

the daughter of his best friend, an agnate of the village *muhtar*, or headman. This alliance gives the patron access to all official information concerning the village, and he acts as host when Turkish officials visit Mandalinci. At the time of my fieldwork he was solidifying his position. Although his prestige is not as high as his rival's, his effective power is greater, since his candidate has won the elective position of village *muhtar*.

The following example demonstrates his sophistication in dealing with important outsiders to the village. It also illustrates how a client uses a patron when he is in dispute.

A youth of about twenty-four years had had a long-term liaison with a married woman who was known in the village for promiscuity. One day he forced her to have intercourse when she did not want to, and to punish him she sent one of her children to her husband, who was at the seaside, with the news that Hasan was "injuring her." The husband passed Hasan on the path to his house, but the two avoided eye contact. The youth had assumed that the husband knew of the affair and had been ignoring it, but he knew now that there would be trouble. Therefore, he went to the home of his patron (he was one of the patron's day laborers at this time) and told him of the incident, asking his intervention.

It so happened that a gendarme captain was visiting the village that day. The patron told Hasan to hide in the shed in his orchard, and then arranged a feast for the gendarme. In his role as host, the patron recounted the history of the liaison and the ways the husband had ignored its existence for four years. Thus, he tactfully arranged to have the captain intervene to mediate the dispute between the husband and lover, in order to prevent the husband from opening a court case against his adversary for "rape."

In the interview with the youthful Hasan, the captain asked if he was carrying any "tokens" from his love. Hasan showed two love letters, a headscarf, and an old photograph. The captain showed these to the husband, advising him of how foolish he would seem in court, bringing charges against a man for rape when there was clear evidence of a long-term love affair. The captain advised the husband to take a firmer stand with his wife and stop being a "pimp." Thus the patron arranged that the youth would be cleared of charges and the husband embarrassed. He thus demonstrated his ability to protect those who remained loyal to him.

### THE PROCESS OF DISPUTING

A brief overview of the disputing process in Mandalinci might read as follows: When a villager in Mandalinci gets into a dispute with another villager, he has a wide choice of social mechanisms and institutions by which he can attempt to handle his grievance. He can talk to the other individual directly. He can talk to the head of the household in which the other person lives. He can discuss the problem with a person he knows (kinsman, affine, friend, or patron) and ask him to see the other person. He can bring the issue to the attention of the village headman, the village council, or the gendarmes stationed in the village to keep peace. He can take the dispute out of the village by going to the subdistrict gendarme, the *kaymakam* (administrative director) of Bodrum, the Bodrum civil police, the Bodrum gendarme, or the Bodrum law court.

An examination of the cases of dispute I collected in the village indicates that some methods of dispute processing are used frequently, while others are rarely invoked or totally ignored. Most individuals choose among alternative processes in an attempt to maximize their own position and advantage. A choice of an in-village technique relates to two factors: (1) how a person views his rank vis-à-vis his opponent, and (2) the stage his dispute has reached (which in turn relates to methods he has used previously and why he thinks these have failed).

But, we need to note, Mandalinci villagers have customary ways of dispute management in which there are no specific individuals who act as judge, arbitrator, mediator, intermediary, go-between, or the like. In this village any household head can fill the role of representative, if a third party is to be brought into the dispute. Unlike most African and European communities, in Mandalinci there is no special setting or special time for discussion of disputes. Although a village council and a village headman are elected every four years on secret ballot by all adult members of the community, and are endowed with authority to hear and arbitrate certain types of disputes, the villagers do not use them for airing grievances. There are no mass meetings in the village. Unlike other Middle Eastern communities described in this volume, in Mandalinci no lineages can be mobilized to back an agnate in dispute, nor is there a forum where two

disputants can, in the presence of their relatives, friends, and covillagers, "talk out" their difficulties.

Instead, there is a method of using "personal networks" to handle all of life's problems. Every individual is at the center of networks of contacts to others. These relations are qualitatively diverse: with some he is in direct, immediate, and intimate contact; with others he is more impersonal. Some relationships are symmetrical, while others are asymmetrical because of rank and power differences. Through personal networks a person is in contact, or can be put into contact, with a great variety of others. The higher a person's rank and power in the village, the more likely he is to have contacts of importance and usefulness outside the village. Networks can be used to extend a person's range of contacts indefinitely, provided a person has the ambition and personality to do so. In this sense an individual's personal networks are "open-ended."

The use of personal networks involves social exchanges (see Mauss 1906). A person conceives of his relationship to another as made up of reciprocal exchanges of favors. In this sense one thinks of a debit-credit sheet, and to ask a favor of another is to accrue a debt to him, which he may collect whenever he wishes. This is the underlying cement of most village relationships and most relationships between villagers and outsiders.

The impartiality of an office holder is alien to much of Turkish thinking. A major way of dealing with Turkish officials and state agencies is by personal intervention on someone's behalf. Office holders in Turkish bureaus accrue a series of obligations and favors with others, and interveners with office holders become involved in exchanges of favors and debts. Despite knowledge of this system of personal networks, villagers are willing to write complaints to anonymous bureau directors when they think they have been mistreated by Turkish officials, gendarmes, or bureaucrats, because they assume their complaint will be taken seriously.

#### *Village-Based Remedy Agents or Institutions*

*Two-Party Negotiation.* Two-party negotiation occurs whenever one individual attempts to deal directly with his opponent to resolve a grievance. It can take the form of confrontation or persuasion.

Whether a person chooses a public or a private setting has important implications for the negotiation process, since an aggrieved individual using a public setting (a coffeehouse, a wedding, a chance meeting on the road) invokes public opinion and community-held norms in support of his position. He also ensures that observers will intervene if the discourse becomes heated and a violent encounter seems imminent. He may choose a private setting, either to keep the conflict and the negotiations secret or to suggest the possibility of violence in order to force resolution. An aggrieved person may also take secret revenge by destroying property belonging to his opponent; self-help is used when someone feels he cannot negotiate for a better settlement.

*Three-Party Negotiation: Representatives.* On a continuum, representatives may range from a young messenger and errand runner to an elder in the community, who by entering into the negotiation process brings much of his rank and power to bear on resolving the situation. The features that distinguish Mandalinci representatives from nonvillage third parties are: (1) they are not impartial, but act in behalf of one of the disputants, and (2) they have no authority to enforce a resolution outside of the pressure they can bring by virtue of their rank, power, and personality. Representatives lend their weight to one side or the other (but one side only), although, of course, they usually are not as partial and short-sighted about a situation as the principal they represent. Thus, by their presence they tend to inject a certain amount of "good sense" into the process and sometimes enter into hard negotiation as well. In Mandalinci the case material reveals that an adult household head, either a male or a female, acts as the representative for someone defined as a minor (i.e., any unmarried household member) in his or her house. Females become heads of households upon the death or absence (due to migrant labor) of their husbands.

The following is an example of how a household head intervenes in a dispute when a household minor has been unable to gain satisfaction.

Some village women went in Turgot's boat to an island about forty-five minutes from the village to gather wild grasses to make *börök* (Turkish pas-

try). As a fee for transporting the women, Turgot, an adult male, went to the seaside store and, without the women's knowledge, had the storekeeper charge each woman's account for two kilos of gasoline (about twenty cents). Several days later, one of the women, Inci, learned of this charge against her account. She was especially upset, because there was an old debt between Turgot and her son, Sadik. The previous summer, when Sadik was fourteen, he and Turgot had worked on the same sponge-diving boat. Turgot had borrowed money from Sadik and had not yet repaid him, although Sadik had asked for the money on at least two occasions.

Inci finds Turgot on the village road when others are present. She shouts at him: "Why are you making bills for me in that store?" Turgot becomes quite agitated. "Why are you asking me in front of other people?" They are both aroused. They walk back and forth in a jerky manner, confronting each other to ask questions or scream abuses, walking away when the other talks. Turgot turns to yell at her: "I did not owe more than eight liras [eighty cents] to your son." He paces more, thinking. He continues, "And one month ago I gave him twenty liras [two dollars] when he asked for it. Another time I gave him thirty liras [three dollars] in the coffeehouse—"

Inci, interrupting, angrily screams, "You are a liar. You are a liar." Turgot retorts, "Your son is a liar. He stole a pencil and says, 'I found this outside near a stone.' That's the way you raise your children." Inci, growing red in the face, says, "We will see how your children grow up also." They stare at each other a minute, and then each goes off in a different direction.

About a week later, Inci's son goes to Turgot in the coffeehouse and again asks for his money. Turgot is very angry, but he pays the debt of thirty liras to Sadik.

Inci's confrontation of Turgot on the road thus had the following effects: It publicized Turgot's recalcitrance in repaying a debt, thus providing additional information for villagers to assess his character, and it humiliated him.

*Village Muhtar and Village Council.* An interesting aspect of Inci's confrontation of Turgot on the road was that the village *muhtar* witnessed the encounter, and yet did nothing to stop the shouting, nor did he intervene later to find out what the problem was. Despite his nonintervention, the *muhtar* and the village council of seven elected members are invested with dispute-settling powers by the Turkish Village Law. But villagers during my fieldwork and earlier

did not bring disputes to them. My best informants said that this was not the way they handled problems.

At first I attempted to explain nonuse of the council and *multar* as due to known alliances and loyalties in the village, which would ensure that the stronger or better connected would win (Starr 1970: 405-8), for villagers say they cannot expect impartiality from others in their village whose very election to office depends on maintaining close associations with those who elected them.<sup>7</sup> Later I explained nonuse as due to the fact that villagers resent the power of fellow villagers to enforce arbitrated outcomes, and that taking a case to the council acknowledges the superior rank of council members (Starr 1974). Now I formulate the process as follows: In disputing with other villagers, persons may start with informal customary methods or may opt for a court-arbitrated decision. When a person invokes informal, customary, negotiatory methods of settling conflicts, he is choosing flexible methods, in which all interested parties can have input into the outcome, and in which there are ways of neutralizing (but not overturning) rank differences between disputants. A person may opt for formal court arbitration when he is unsatisfied with a negotiated outcome; when he wants to *upset* the status quo of social and political rank of his village opponent; when he wants to limit the area of conflict; or when resources are in dispute. Multiple motives may determine court use, for the above reasons are not mutually exclusive. Conflicting claims to the same resource generate prolonged conflict within the village, and a negotiated village outcome over a scarce resource may leave a person unsatisfied with his share. Thus a villager goes to court because he wants coerciveness, limitations on the issues to be discussed, complete control over the resource, or a formal break in a relationship (Starr 1975).

#### *Relation of Village Disputing Behavior to Law Processes*

An individual's decision to disrupt the village disputing processes has clear consequences. Village dispute processes effectively preserve ongoing, multiplex, affectional relations and maintain the status quo in social, economic, and political rank, *solely* because techniques of

village disputing behavior are based on the *social recognition* of the disputants' occupational status, rank, prestige, and power (Starr 1978). To take a case out of the village for the first time is a calculated risk. But villagers who begin disputing at court usually become quite knowledgeable about court procedures, what decisions to expect, and how to use the court to their advantage. As Galanter (1974) and others have shown, litigants who are "repeaters" at court have a strategic advantage over first-time users, because they have acquired knowledge of how to open and process a lawsuit, how judges reason and make decisions, what services lawyers give despite their high fees, and what aspects of Turkish law can be used to help a litigant win. If an individual is an opportunist, going to court for the first time is a new learning process, a new arena in which to compete with his rivals and adversaries, and a new exercise of his political and diplomatic skills. Furthermore, following his own case through its many hearings and watching the procedures of court personnel and judges in the courthouse gives a rural villager opportunity to see, hear, and learn the bureaucratic and ideological basis of the new Turkish state. For some villagers it is an overwhelming experience, and they do not want to venture into the courtroom again. For others, however, it opens up entirely new vistas and horizons. Thus a person who has once initiated a successful lawsuit will probably in time again seek court intervention in his local quarrels, since he has learned to use the legal system to his advantage. For instance, the leader of the central village faction eventually pursued his dispute against his brother over an orchard through the appellate court system in Ankara, where he attempted to use connections to gain information concerning the outcome of his case (Starr 1975). In contrast, however, approximately 75 percent of the adult population in Mandalinci have never been litigants in anything but routine matters (i.e., nondisputes) in the Bodrum court.

#### *Turkish Rural Law Enforcement Agents*

At least two aspects of village disputing behavior relate to Turkish law enforcement agencies and the national legal system. The first is a calculated risk taken by a villager that he will gain more by

disputing at court than by doing nothing or by negotiating in the village. His other option concerns the use of the gendarmerie. I will discuss the gendarmerie first, since invoking them usually leads to criminal procedures at court.

*Village-based Gendarmes.* A gendarme station has been maintained in the village since about 1900. In recent years, its ostensible purpose has been to prevent smuggling between nearby Greek islands and the Turkish mainland. Gendarmes are never stationed in the region of their birth, and thus they are outsiders to the village social system. A characteristic of the sergeant and two soldiers stationed in Mandalinci is their interpretation of their mandate to intervene in situations which they classify as "potentially violent." Since there is not much for the gendarmes to do, they tend to enforce rather strictly the Turkish gun laws, which state that every person carrying a gun must have a gun permit. In the past, it had been village custom to shoot off guns at weddings and other celebrations. A few villagers use old guns to hunt small game, and villagers have been known to shoot off guns in a gleeful mood, all of which have led the gendarmes to investigate, and sometimes to make arrests, which involve interviews by the district prosecutor in Bodrum and sometimes trial for criminal activities in the Bodrum court.

On five occasions during my fieldwork, four different villagers asked a gendarme to intervene in a dispute on their behalf. And, when a serious wounding occurred in a fight between two village youths, the gendarmes were quickly informed, as they controlled the only village telephone, and the parents of one youth needed to summon a vehicle to take their son to the Bodrum hospital. In this dispute, the intervention of village gendarmes clearly acted to prevent retaliation and the spread of violence to larger kin or friendship units. But in another village dispute the intervention of the gendarmes escalated the dispute into the Bodrum court, where only the judge's careful sifting of events and claims eventually straightened out the underlying issues and so resolved the dispute (see below).

*District Gendarme Officers.* On several different occasions during my fieldwork, district gendarme officers came to Mandalinci on business. In two cases, they came to investigate claims made in letters

about alleged misconduct on the part of a local gendarme. On a third, a captain was merely spending a leisurely off-duty day at a "scenic seaside" village, but his visit coincided with an erupting dispute between a man and his wife's young lover, for which he successfully negotiated a village resolution. All interactions between villagers and gendarmes do not have such beneficial outcomes, however. The following is a dispute which escalated while I was living in the village:

One of the married village women, known as a prostitute, also had special boyfriends. One of them, Erol, from a nearby village, brought her bags of vegetables and hid them under the sofa on her porch in return for her sexual favors. One night during a drunken visit, he shot off a gun in her house. Villagers heard the shots, but no one was hurt, and no villager thought further about it. When a village gendarme came the next day to investigate the shots, no one remembered hearing any. But the gendarme reported the shots to his captain in Bodrum, and a few days later the captain came to Mandalinci to investigate the "alleged" shots. Before proceeding to the house, however, he drank *raki* (Turkish hard liquor) at the harbor coffeehouse. He stayed there until very intoxicated. He then asked a respected old village man to take him up the hill to the house in question. The wife was at home, but the husband was not. The captain searched the house for bullet holes and bullets, staggering around and unpleasantly drunk, the villagers said. Several of the villagers surmised that he had come to the village to spend money on the prostitute.

When the woman's husband realized how long the captain had remained alone with his wife in his house in a state of intoxication, he was angry. He wrote a letter to the gendarme station in Muğla, the state capital (*vilayet*), claiming that the captain had molested his wife. Four days later, the director of the Muğla gendarme station arrived in the village with a retinue of three jeeps. He talked with the respected old man, with the husband, and with the wife, gathering evidence concerning the conduct of his subordinate officer. I never learned the outcome of this investigation, for a gendarme director can discipline a lower officer as he sees fit but his action is not made public.

The point I wish to underline, however, is that gendarmes play a complex role in keeping village peace. Their presence in the village clearly allays certain kinds of violence, but gendarmes also interact

with villagers in ways which create new disputes between villagers, and between the gendarmes and certain villagers. Thus, integration into larger social units has both benefits and drawbacks for Mandalinci people. Benefits accrue from undercutting a value system which suggests that a man *ought* to actively retaliate within an eighteen-hour period against another adult male who has committed an offense against his honor. Disadvantages accrue from giving gendarmes "authoritative positions of power over villagers" (Starr 1978).<sup>8</sup> Villagers are virtually defenseless when gendarme behavior affronts their values. The only redress open to them is to make written complaints to a gendarme's superior officer, and hope that that officer will feel responsible for the behavior of his subordinate.

*The Turkish Legal System.* When a villager takes a grievance out of the village context, he has a number of arenas in which to seek justice, but some arenas are determined by the type of grievance. For instance, if he has a grievance over land he can take the case to be heard at the administrative office of the district director in Bodrum (the *Kaymakam*) or he can open a case directly at the lower or higher Bodrum civil law court, depending on whether the disputed land is over or under 1,000 liras (\$100) in value. If he feels some type of crime has been committed against him or his property, he can report the alleged behavior directly to the village gendarme, to the subdistrict gendarme (stationed in a large nearby village), or directly to the public prosecutor. (See fig. 4.1 for a diagram of the chain of jurisdiction pertaining to civil and criminal cases that occur in the village.)

*The Gendarmes.* Village gendarmes exercise a degree of discretion in filing reports. I recorded at least three instances in which, after carrying out a village investigation, the gendarme did not make a written report, meaning the matter was dropped. On the other hand, the subdistrict gendarmes, being unfamiliar with village personalities, are more likely to make a written report immediately, which then leads directly to the public prosecutor's office.

*The Public Prosecutor.* The public prosecutor (whose office is located in the Bodrum courthouse rather than in the police station) is required to carry out his own investigation. He reads the earlier reports, interviews the principals, and interrogates witnesses to at-

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


Figure 4.1. Chain of jurisdiction pertaining to civil and criminal cases. A case can be terminated at any level. Cases ordinarily do not go from lower civil or lower criminal court to the next higher court, although occasionally an administrative error places a case in the wrong court. If so, the judge has it transferred.

tempt to establish whether (1) any activity which could be considered lawbreaking has occurred, and (2) whether there is evidence which will stand up in court as "alleged criminal activity." Thus, the public prosecutor also has considerable discretion in deciding which cases to

prosecute. However, his high salary, his training (which involves four years' study at one of Turkey's two law schools), his sense of professionalism, and the fact that his "record keeping" is subject to official scrutiny at least once a year, all act to keep him accountable to standards set by the national government and to national codes of criminal procedure and criminal law.

*The Bodrum Law Court.* The Bodrum courthouse stands in a residential neighborhood, isolated from other public offices, on an unpaved side street two blocks from the sea. The court has two judges and a public prosecutor. It is divided into four courts of law: the *sulh hukuk mahkemesi* (lower civil court), whose jurisdiction is civil cases involving up to 1,000 liras (in 1967, about \$100) worth of property; *asliye hukuk mahkemesi* (higher civil court), whose jurisdiction is all other civil cases; *sulh ceza mahkemesi* (lower criminal court), which hears minor criminal cases as defined by the Turkish Criminal Code; and *asliye ceza mahkemesi* (middle criminal court), with jurisdiction over serious crimes up to and including involuntary manslaughter.

In theory, one of the two Bodrum judges presides over the lower civil and lower criminal courts, and the other is in charge of the higher civil and middle criminal courts. In practice, however, they often replace each other at the bench. The public prosecutor takes an interest in and follows all criminal cases, but he sits on the bench (to the right of the judge) only during the middle criminal court hearings. There is no jury for either civil or criminal cases.

People waiting for their case to be called sit or squat outside the courtroom, while inside a formal atmosphere is maintained. The judge and the public prosecutor wear black robes over pants and shirts, and the lawyers wear ties and Western suits. Women are expected not to cross their legs in court (even though they wear long dresses or baggy pants), and observers are required to be silent. Individuals giving testimony are required to stand. Only rarely is someone asked to give sworn testimony; the two instances I observed involved old people, one of whom swore on a Koran and the other on a loaf of bread. Judges told me afterwards that these two old people would believe in the efficacy of their oath.

One of the four male court stenographers sits at a table directly

in front of the judge's bench during each court session. The judge questions the plaintiff, defendant, and witnesses, and after each testimony he dictates the answer himself to the stenographer, who types them on a standard, manual typewriter. Lawyers cannot directly cross-examine principals or witnesses, but must put their questions to the judge, who, if he considers a question relevant, asks it. After the first hearing, a lawyer may appear in place of a defendant in a civil case, but in criminal matters the defendant himself is required to appear each time.

One stenographer acts as head clerk, court treasurer, notary (the only one in Bodrum), and also as official debt collector, who oversees seizure and sale of goods when a judgment is executed. Another stenographer works mainly for the public prosecutor. A third is associated with both civil courts, while the fourth works with both criminal courts. Two other male employees are associated with the court: the younger, twenty-three years of age, acts as sergeant-at-arms during court hearings; the other, a man of about sixty, prepares and processes warrants, summonses, and billings. Both are sent for coffee and on other errands. Gendarmes deliver summonses and guard prisoners. A woman employed by the court acts as caretaker of the Bodrum jail and prepares food for the prisoners. The job is not sex-linked, however, for before her employment a man held this job.

Bodrum itself had no lawyers (*avukat*) at the period of my fieldwork, nor had any lived there previously. The nearest lawyers, of whom there were sixteen, lived in Milas, a city ninety kilometers away by an unpaved road. Usually lawyers appeared only in serious criminal cases and in cases with wealthy defendants. There were in Bodrum, however, four legal representatives (*vekil*), who lacked formal legal training but had become experts in civil litigation, especially concerning land. A *vekil* has the same prerogatives as a lawyer in a civil case; that is, he can prepare briefs, address questions to the judge, and appear in place of the defendant after the first hearing.

Court hearings are not continuous. The ideal form is for plaintiff and defendant to state their claims in the first hearing and to name witnesses. The witnesses are called and heard about ten days to three weeks later and, ideally, a decision is given in a third hearing.

Many different events and problems prolong disposition, however, so that an average case has approximately six hearings and extends over three to six months. Certain types of crimes, such as those which threaten the security of Bodrum town (e.g., smuggling, street brawling, possession of dynamite), fall into a special category which requires them to be heard promptly to completion.

The following case, involving four Mandalinci villagers and a village gendarme, illustrates how a husband used village gendarmes in a dispute to limit the area of discussion in the ensuing criminal case. It further illustrates how a judge in probing facts, evidence, motives, and goals to get at underlying causes of the conflict cleared up the difficulty and found a solution to the dispute which all principals considered equitable (Nader and Starr 1973) and which the judge himself felt was in accordance with Turkish law.

Ismail, a sixteen-year-old village youth, was going to Milas. Fatma, a married village woman with a reputation for prostitution, asked him to bring her a dress of a certain material from a Milas store. She said she would pay him when he returned. He bought the dress, which at least four villagers saw. "Is that dress for your mother?" they asked. Ismail laughed and said, "Would my mother wear that shiny thing?" According to villagers, the most beautiful material is metallic; such dresses are worn to weddings.

Ismail gave the dress to Fatma and asked for his seventy lira (about seven dollars), but she said, "I'll pay you later." Whenever he asked her, she always said the same thing. Finally, annoyed, he went to her, saying, "I am going after sponges. Can you give me my money now?" She thought a moment, and then said, "Come to my house at night. I will put a big copper pot outside. You can take it and sell it. If you get more than seventy liras for it, give me what is left over."

Late that night, as Ismail was carrying the pot away from her house, a friend of his, about his age, saw him. Ismail said, "Come, let's hide this somewhere. Later we will sell it and divide the money."

The friend helped him, but the next day he went to Adnan, Fatma's husband, and told him how Ismail had taken his pot and where it was hidden. The husband went to the village gendarme with the story. In the evening the gendarme and the husband waited together near the place where the pot was hidden. When Ismail came to pick up his pot, they captured him. They took him to the subdistrict gendarme station to question him and

to make out a police report. Later a criminal case for stealing was opened against him in the Bodrum court.

Fatma was called to court as a witness. The judge asked her, "Do you owe Ismail any money?" "No," she said, "I have no debt to him." The judge then asked Ismail if he had any witnesses. "Not today," Ismail replied, "but material like her dress is not available in the village. Such material is not even sold in Bodrum." At a later hearing Ismail produced four witnesses. Each said, "We saw this material when he had it before he gave it to her, and in fact she is wearing that very dress in court today."

When the judge turned to Fatma to ask her to take an oath that Ismail had not paid for this dress, Fatma began crying. The judge said, "Don't spill tears on your new dress." Fatma asked that her pot be returned. The judge said, "Pay the money you owe and you can have your pot." After the court decision, Adnan paid Ismail 70 lira and took his wife's cooking pot back to her.

Many disputes which Mandalinci villagers take to the Bodrum court do not provide a decision satisfactory to *all* litigants and witnesses. (Witnesses may be principal actors in the village dispute, as Fatma was in the above case.) To achieve a satisfactory outcome takes time, skill, and patience on the part of the judge. The same judge usually sits for all hearings of a case, and he needs to engage in investigative work connected with the hearing and to review the court dossier at each hearing to see and evaluate past testimony. When the judge (or another official, such as a gendarme or civil policeman) probes social relations between litigants to find the underlying causes of specific events in the dispute, he frequently is successful in narrowing the focus of the conflict, in finding a way to resolve these narrower issues, and in giving a judgment which not only is binding but also is acceptable to both parties.

When judges are busy or pressed for time, they appear less interested in understanding the aspects of the social relations which have produced conflict than in applying "appropriate laws" in order to provide a judgment acceptable to the scrutiny of higher judges. In part, judges' schedules are full in the Bodrum court because of the way they define a workday and the hours they are willing to spend at the bench. This means that at times they ascertain "facts" as if "facts"

were not embedded in the daily experiences of the litigants and thus were not susceptible to multiple layers of meaning. When this happens, judges may produce decisions which are in accordance with Turkish law codes and thus in a strict sense are legal but which leave one or more of the litigants unsatisfied because the narrow, legalistic decisions do not do what Llewellyn and Hoebel have claimed is an important job of law—to “clean up social messes” (1941: 20). When this happens the same litigants return to court, usually with a new complaint arising out of the same conflict-ridden social relationship. I have pointed out elsewhere (Starr 1975) that many Bodrum court decisions are not final in the sense that they resolve claims and disputes. Many court decisions only act to clarify a particular issue or claim in dispute; the clarification then becomes the basis of the next litigation between the same principals. Complex disputes may need two or more lawsuits to begin to resolve the controversy. One dispute over title to a tangerine grove entailed eight lawsuits in a six-year period. Given this situation, the counting of decisions that favor or go against the plaintiff yields little insight into the social effects of judicial decisions.

### CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSION

1. Mandalinci village has customary processes of disputing in which no specific individual acts as judge, arbitrator, mediator, intermediary, go-between, or the like. If a third party is brought into the dispute, any adult household head can become a representative of one side or the other when necessary. In Mandalinci there is no special setting or special time for discussion of disputes; setting and context are left to the disputants to choose.

2. Despite the seeming randomness in site, setting, and context for the negotiation of disputes there are patterns that emerge from the disputes I recorded in a year and a half of village study which suggest how villagers select among competing modes (negotiation in the village or arbitration at the Bodrum court).

3. The village council and a village *muhtar* are both endowed with authoritative dispute-settling powers by the Turkish Village Law of 1924, but villagers do not take disputes to them to be resolved.

Villagers avoid and resent the “law powers” of their fellow villagers. They prefer to negotiate on an informal basis, since the outcomes are more flexible and negotiation as a process is part of everyone’s daily, routinized behavior.

4. Furthermore, villagers say they cannot expect impartiality from others in their village whose very election to office depends on maintaining a support group. I take this to mean that villagers do not feel that the restraints of office (headman or council member) offset the personalities filling these statuses, since persons exercising official roles continue to maintain close and reciprocal ties to their supporters. This suggests that friendship and political networks take precedence over the restraints of impartiality which many Western social scientists claim prevent officials from exerting bias in job performance. In fact, the impartiality of an office holder is alien to much of Turkish thinking.

5. Thus, nonuse of the village *muhtar* and council is explained as follows. First, villagers do not want legal and hence binding decisions made by their fellow villagers, because more flexible, negotiated outcomes are available through informal, customary, village behaviors, and all disputants can participate in achieving a satisfactory outcome. Second, villagers have techniques of equalizing rank differences between disputants by their choice of representative. Third, taking disputes to the headman and council *masks* real social ties that the latter have, which are based on reciprocal debts and favors. Allowing the headman or council to hear disputes is to permit already powerful people (because of their office and their numerous and diverse dyadic ties) to gain additional power. Fourth, long-term disputes represent multiplex, affectional relations in which conflict repeatedly recurs because of the unsuccessful negotiation of past disputes. When individuals in such relationships focus their accumulated conflicts around a specific issue (such as inheritance, ownership of land or houses, unpaid debts) or when anger breaks into violence (insult, hitting), the push for resolution may become irresistible. Angry words or striking another may be translated into “criminal behavior” reportable to the gendarme or prosecutable at the Bodrum court.

0. Focusing the conflict in the relationship around an issue of inheritance or land ownership allows one or both persons to seek an arbitrated decision at the district court. Whether the judicial decision resolves the issues and restores the ongoing, multiplex relationship to a state of mutual help and affection, or results in mutual avoidance to prevent further disruptive encounters, depends in great measure on the amount of time and care Bodrum judges take in understanding the multiple levels of meaning each disputant attaches to the "facts" in the case.

7. When judges do not consider all aspects of a case which are important to the plaintiff and defendant and to their principal witnesses (who may have as active an interest in the court decision as the named litigants), then the judicial decision may not take into account the underlying grievances and issues, which frequently concern scarce resources and the distribution of power relations that the control of resources provides. This means that a principal to the dispute may be unsatisfied with the narrow legal decision, feeling his position has not been fully recognized. When this happens an unsatisfied claimant may either send the decision to appellate court in Ankara or open an ostensibly new case, focused around another legal aspect of the same issues.

#### NOTES

1. The fieldwork for this paper was conducted on a National Institute of Mental Health Traineeship and Field Grant for sixteen months in 1966-68, and I gratefully acknowledge this support. I want to thank Laura Nader, who continually pushed me to analyze and understand the connection between village disputing practices and the Bodrum law court; Richard Abel for his thoughtful criticisms; Michael Lowy for showing me that the "meanings" attached to court use are problematic; Grace Brizajko for editing this paper; and finally, Elizabeth Colson, whose critical notes on my dissertation (Starr 1970) have led me into deeper study of the social relations between disputing parties and the ways in which disputes intertwine with village values.

2. This material is analyzed in Starr (1978: 258-62) and is not repeated here.

3. The twenty-seven cases of dispute are presented and analyzed in detail in my monograph (Starr, 1978). Category 1 consists of sixteen disputes between Mandalinci villagers (case numbers 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31,

32); category 2 contains three disputes between Mandalinci villagers and villagers living in a twenty-five-mile radius (case numbers 4, 20, 25); category 3, five disputes between Mandalinci villagers and foreigners (i.e., citizens of other countries) (case numbers 5, 6, 18, 19, 27); and category 4, three disputes between Mandalinci villagers and Turkish officials (i.e., bureaucrats or gendarmes) (case numbers 25, 26, and example 2).

4. See also Abel (1973: 226-27); Starr and Yngvesson (1975: 559, 561, 564).

5. Barth (1966: 15) points out that "regardless of our initial evaluations—if something becomes dirt cheap, we may start treating it as dirt; in other words, we tend to revise our evaluations."

6. Compare Stirling (1974: 217-21) for changing relations between fathers and sons, and hevceh brothers, under the impact of increasing knowledge and contact with wider Turkish society, including the possibility of working for wages.

7. Hunt and Hunt (1969: 124-26) document, in their article on rural Mexico, how lower officials are entwined in local social networks and thus lose their neutrality.

8. This supports two of Colson's (1974) assertions: first, that individuals in small-scale, face-to-face communities who know the disadvantages of minimal or diffuse governmental institutions might find greater security in incorporation into larger administrative units (1974: 6), and secondly, that leaders of nation-states, introducing unified court and administrative systems, are "less aware of the need to find a means whereby citizens can pursue grievances against the state and its agents" (1974: 7).